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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GERMAN OFFICER STRATEGIC EDUCATION: A CRITICAL OMISSION

BY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

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TITLE:

German Officer Strategic Education: A Critical Omission

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

09 April 2002

PAGES: 37

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Most military professionals today would agree that no amount of tactical success can make up for a failure to plan strategically. Some countries, however, have overlooked this fact. Hans Delbruck, a noted German military historian and strategist, concluded that senior German planners failed to think and plan strategically during World War I. Incredibly, German planners again neglected strategic planning in World War II. Delbruck's thesis raises some interesting questions: Was there actually a general lack of strategic level thinking in the German officer corps? If this was true, was the failure to think and plan on the strategic level of war due to a lack of officer professional education? This SRP concludes that the German officer corps did not have a proper appreciation or education for the strategic level of war.

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GERMAN OFFICER STRATEGIC EDUCATION: A CRITICAL OMISSION

Every People is the child of its history, its past, and can no more break away from it than a man can separate himself from his youth.

Hans Delbruck, Krieg und Politik.

From the beginnings of the second German Empire (1871) the German Officer Corps demonstrated a troubling characteristic, the inability to think and plan on the strategic level of war. German officer training prior to both world wars produced highly skilled freethinking tactical and operational leaders with many of the traits that the U.S. Army seeks today. Particularly during World War II, the German Officer displayed tactical and operational brilliance on the battlefield that shocked and amazed the world, yet both wars ended in the defeat of Germany. It is generally accepted by most military historians that the German political and military leadership failed strategically during World War I. It appears that these strategic lessons or failures were ignored after the war, since German planners in World War II tended to ignore the strategic level. Instead, they again focused on tactical and operational brilliance to achieve their goals. Conversely, no amount of tactical success was able to overcome their failure at the strategic level. German military schools produced officers that were well trained and highly skilled on the lower levels of war, but they displayed a lack of ability to think, to conceptualize at the most important level of war, the strategic level. Why did these tactical and operational geniuses fail to plan strategically? Was there a general lack of strategic level thinking in the German officer corps? If this is found to be true, then why? Was it due to an absence or lack of emphasis on the strategic level of war and strategic thinking at all levels of officer professional education and training?

These German failures strike some students of strategy as a great contradiction, especially in light of the fact that one Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz developed many of the strategic concepts that are taught today at the United States Army War College¹. Clausewitz saw clearly that war should be an instrument of state policy and must have its roots in the policy aims of the state. In his famous treatise *On War*, he proclaimed: "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." ² Warfare without political direction is senseless; war must be an extension of policy. He further contended that this connection is dependant on the relationship between three key elements that he called the "Remarkable Trinity", Government, Army, People. These concepts specify the essential elements of a successful war and, more importantly, indicate why a nation may elect to wage war.³ Military

endeavors and the political goal must remain linked. If one accepts Clausewitz, it follows that effective officer education must at some level go beyond purely military subjects. A military strategist must understand both 'military endeavors' and the 'political object' in order to comprehend the critical linkage between the two.⁴

Logic dictates that a broader education is needed to understand this complex connection between 'military endeavors' and the 'political object'. Since Military Strategy at the national strategic level is only meaningful in a nation's political goals, the study of politics, foreign relations, and other areas outside typical military subjects is essential to officer professional development. Only this type of education will arm an officer with the knowledge necessary to consider the political environment and translate national objectives and guidance into clear, concise, and achievable military objectives. A broader education will produce a senior officer who understands strategy, can interact effectively with civilian counterparts, and then formulate the best military strategy for the nation. Prussian military educators, who provided the basis of much of the German military educational system, originally offered a more comprehensive curriculum, which would seem to have promoted such a broader base of knowledge. By 1860, however, a narrower curriculum for officer training emerged omitting educational subjects that could provide a better understanding of politics and strategy.⁶ This change may have contributed to constricting the German military's ability to produce strategic leaders. In short, the problem was that the emerging German officer education system no longer provided officers with the tools to understand national strategy issues.

The ensuing absence of instruction in politics and the strategic art by the German officer education system appears to have had a greater impact than could have imagined at the time. Adding to this problem was an accompanying subtle change that occurred by the middle part of the 19th Century. It was recognized by one author who stated:

In the past, great commanders like Gustavus Aldolphus, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon had coordinated policy by combining all power in a single hand, but this had become impossible by the middle of the nineteenth century. An exceptional statesman like Bismarck, enjoying the full confidence and support of the ruler, and a soldier of the caliber of the elder Moltke still could arrive, albeit grudgingly, at a common understanding at what was necessary, desirable, and possible in war. But once these men were gone, strategic planning in Germany and for that matter in most European states, was dominated by military appreciations alone and no longer was subject to any serious political appraisal and review ⁷

The limitations of the German officer education program and the limitations in the span of control exercised by heads of state first in Prussia and later in the German Empire, led to inadequacies in strategic experience and education.

This Strategic Research Project (SRP) will briefly examine the development of the German Officer Corps, leading up to the twentieth century, and examine its failure to emphasize the strategic level of war or strategic thinking at any level of officer professional education. The analysis will focus on officer education during the periods of the Second and Third German Empires (1871 until 1945), covering both the Cadet Schools to the War Academies. A short assessment of the strategic failures of World War I and World War II will provide context for conclusions and lessons learned. A review of available evidence will make it clear that the German professional military education system failed to adequately prepare its officers for the strategic challenges that lay ahead. This SRP is in no way intended to denigrate the accomplishments of the great German military thinkers using historical hindsight. On the contrary, it seeks to better understand the impact that a general lack of strategic level education has on an officer corps, in particular the impact it has on those officers who will become the nations senior military/strategic leaders. Even today many American military leaders are not comfortable with pursuit of the political aspects of war so necessary to the development of effective strategy. Simply stated, soldiers then and today do not feel comfortable in the realm of politics, which forms the foundations for higher-level military strategy. Solid officer education that goes beyond purely military subjects provides the best solution to this challenge.

THE PRUSSIAN/GERMAN OFFICER: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Few images are so stereotypical as those that people have of the pre-1945 'German Officer'. One immediately thinks of the Prussian aristocrat, the Junker. This was not always the case. A professional officer corps is actually something quite recent in the German experience. For example, in the 17th century; "officers" in many German states were the heads of mercenary bands. At that time, "Germany" was an array of some 2000 principalities, cities, and independent duchies that were dominated by the Holy Roman Emperor. These states came under constant threat due to their poor geographical position, which in all likelihood promoted at least some degree of militarism. In Europe a gradual transition from mercenary to professional standing armies occurred over time. In this transition, armies developed into disciplined forces whose officers gave obedience and loyalty to the king. Frederick William the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia (1640-1688), who had experience with the Dutch forces and knowledge of French military reform, began the slow process of binding the officers of his army to the

sovereign. He started new regiments and appointed their colonels, although the practice of regimental commanders appointing their own regimental officers did not stop. He also established taxation to support his army and the nucleus of a centralized military bureaucracy, which were to become the basis of the future Prussian state.

This system was later key to the development of the German Army and Officer Corps. His son, Frederick William I (1713-1740) continued to develop a centralized administration for royal government, and financial administration of army supplies and military finance. Frederick William I adopted a plain military uniform for his personal dress (Prussian Blue uniforms used by Germany until 1914). He did this to entice and integrate the Junker class into his officer corps and thus bind them to his state. "By wearing a simple uniform himself, Frederick William identified service in the officer corps of the Prussian army with nobility and honor. The bond between the king and his officers and, in turn, their authority over locally recruited soldiers was enhanced by the fact that it perpetuated the feudal relationship". The downside to placing Junker nobility in uniform was their total lack of military professionalism. Still, a link was forged between members of the nobility and the officer corps promoting a tradition of service to the king, and the Prussian values of piety, duty, obedience and endurance" 10

Frederick II (Frederick the Great, 1740-1786) continued the practice of wearing a simple blue uniform, which made the statement that the officers (nobility) were proud to wear the "king's coat". By the onset of his reign, the Prussian officer corps was mostly a closed circle of nobles. Although he did commission many bourgeoisie officers during the Seven years' War, (1756-1763) these officers were later purged. Social exclusiveness was a characteristic of the Prussian officer corps that was to last for sometime. Granted, some officers were genuinely interested in their profession, but most were not. His officers were not motivated by patriotism, but were bound by loyalty and duty to the person of the king. This cultural tradition seems to continue, in some cases into the Third Reich period. The Prussian officer's strategic perspective, limited to that of simply a leading German state, also carries though to a later descendents, the twentieth-century German Officer.

Despite the progress made in the 18th century, in making the Prussian officer corps more professional, the Prussia military had a varied performance during the Napoleonic wars. The defeats by Napoleon, however, brought home the need for reform and led to the emergence of a reform group. The period immediately following the Napoleonic wars became a period dominated by military reform and the foundation of the Prussian/German military education system.

OFFICER EDUCATION, THE PERIOD OF REFORM

The Prussian army of the nineteenth century was created by four exceptional leaders: Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Scharnhost, and Gneisenau." Ironically, Prussian military reform came from two non-Prussian born officers, General Gerhard Scharnhost and Graf Von Gneisenau who were part of a group simply known as the "Reformers". The Reformers recognized the profound social and political changes produced by the French Revolution and, as a result, began the development of the Prussian/German officer education system. Hajo Holborn aptly describes the time of Frederick to the time of Reformers best:

There was undoubtedly in the Prussian army an overemphasis on the minutiae of military life, which was originally counterbalanced by the strategic genius of the king. He did not train younger strategists, however, and it was a foreign conqueror who reminded the Prussians of the role that strategy plays in warfare, and two young officers, both non-Prussians by birth, had to remold the Prussian army, which they did largely along the modern French pattern.¹⁴

Seeing the need for formal education, General Scharnhorst laid the groundwork for the General War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) in 1810. The school was first intended to prepare officer candidates for their officer exam and to give young officers better scientific training. The now famous General von Clausewitz was the director of the General War School for a number of years. The King of Prussia, Frederick Wilhelm II, who later founded three war schools for officer candidates, reserved the General War School for senior officers. In 1859, the General War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) was renamed the War Academy (Kriegsakademie). General Scharnhorst also recognized the need for a school to train General Staff Officers:

Normally it is not possible for an army to simply dismiss incompetent generals. The very authority which their office bestows upon generals is the first reason for this. Moreover, the generals form a clique, tenaciously supporting each other, all convinced that they the best possible representatives of the army. But we can at least give them capable assistants. Thus, the General Staff officers are those who support incompetent generals, providing the talents that might otherwise be wanting among leaders and commanders.

In his study of the Prussian-German General Staff System, Oberst Christian Millotat described how General Scharnhorst was realistic in his expectations of reform in the Prussian Army. He wanted to have a class of educated elite officers who competed for position based on ability and not according to class and birthright. This was not possible given the social conditions in Prussia. Consequently, until 1918 a number of soldiers of higher nobility commanded armies without the proper training.¹⁷ Thus, the German General staff was born. By the end of the century, "Under the command of Field Marshals Count Von Moltke and Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the Prussian-German General Staff developed into the highest strategic authority in

Prussia and, after 1871, in the German Empire. In the end the political forces in Germany hardly participated in its strategic planning: rather, they were informed about them." 18

Although Scharnhorst could not have envisioned what was to happen, the problem is evident today. When Scharnhorst developed the General War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) and the General Staff system, he assumed that the King as commander-in-chief would make the basic decisions of war, peace and national strategy. The General Staff was there to give him the needed military advice to make political and political–military decisions. The General Staff officers, who grew out of the more direct influence of Scharnhost and von Clausewitz, were educated to fulfill this role effectively. General von Moltke, who graduated in 1826 from the General War School (the predecessor of the War Academy), offers the best example. It seems that Moltke was one of the few to truly understand the political-military linkage. Walter Goerlitz stated this well in his History of the German General Staff:

It was the main fortune that Moltke was a disciple of Clausewitz. Military men are rarely militarists, but they tend to underestimate the difficulty of adapting military means to secure political ends. Clausewitz makes it clear, or at least it is implicit in his doctrine that the choice of ends, and also to some extent the choice of limits within which any set of means is to be employed, lies outside the soldier's sphere, and in this Moltke followed his master, for in the main he submitted himself to Bismarck's direction, though his personal relations were cool. It was Germany's tragedy that this twin star constellation of the great soldier and the great statesman was to remain unique and never be repeated in her history.²¹

At this point it seemed that Prussia was proceeding in the right direction with regard to education and the role of strategy. This was to change. As Steven Clemente noted in <u>FOR</u> KING AND KAISER (The Making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860-1914):

Prussian Officer education actually declined in quality during the imperial period. Despite the liberal beginnings of Scharnhorst, professional curricula throughout most of the nineteenth century, and especially during the imperial period, were increasingly confined to purely military studies. Providing a broad view of events, ideas, and people was, if not publicly scorned, determined by the army to be the business of secondary schools and universities, not the armed forces. The state controlled school system, however did little below the university level to promote critical thought. Consequently, the officers, some of whom had not completed the last three years of their secondary education, learned little that would aide them in dealing with civilians, contemporary ideas or anything other than armies, soldiers, and the socialists scourge. Amidst the lessons that glorified war and the Germanic race, obedience rated far above initiative and individual thought...while exhibiting martial skill, many who made it to the top echelons lacked sufficient formal training in broad areas outside of military studies.²²

His assertion that a school curriculum could produce such narrowing effects appears valid, according to original source documents.²³

The period after 1862 was marked by military expansion, a personal priority of the King, William I and dominance in the field of strategy by the Iron Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck. It is quite understandable that with this expansion the state would avoid controversial and political topics. Naturally the monarch would and did strive for a loyal, apolitical officer corps as opposed to a worldlier politically astute officer corps concerned with questions of international politics and state policy. This concept of freeing officers from political concerns must have made perfect sense to a monarch of that time. The assumption was that politicians should take care of politics and soldiers would handle the wars. This narrow approach tended to produce military officers who were ineffective strategists. A Senior Military Leader must, however, have an understanding of political issues in order to In order to effectively translate national objectives and guidance into clear, concise, and achievable military objectives. In short, since war is a political act, an officer needs an understanding of politics in order to understand or develop strategy. Michael Geyer later reflected on this kind of officer education:

The Universalist approach to strategy depended on the autonomy of the military and the maintenance of a dichotomy between the military and civilian society. The dualism was not far removed from a "liberal" notion of civilian-military relations. In liberal tradition, strategy remained separate from military doctrine, the guideline for optimal use of weapons and men. The former was considered the domain of politics and the latter the realm of military men. The gap between the two was bridged by an elite discourse concerning commitments of the nation. The German military did not entertain debates about war, strategy and national defense. It possessed the certain knowledge of war-and this knowledge failed in 1914.

The influence of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Scharnhost, and Gneisenau on German officer education was eclipsed by Field Marshal Count Von Moltke the elder whose influence tends to dominate German military thought into the next century. ²⁵ In fact, German officers of the Second and Third Reichs were more disciples of von Moltke the elder than of Scharnhorst or Clausewitz.

King Frederick William selected General von Moltke as Chief of General Staff in 1857. ²⁶ It was von Moltke the elder who advocated the shift away from liberal studies and increased emphasis on purely military subjects. Starting with General von Moltke, the power and influence of the General Staff and Military grew to the point that later criticism rings true: "The Prussian monarchy was not a country, but an Army that had a country which it used as a billeting area" Moltke was at one time head of the Military History Division of the General Staff. He wrote historical studies that were considered the best of the time; they had tremendous impact for generations to come. His text on the double wing envelopment at *Cannae* was to influence Von

Schlieffen and his disciples.²⁸ While curriculums prior to 1871 included a course on *Effective Strategic Development*, by 1871 it had been eliminated from the War Academy instruction.²⁹ Feldmarshall von Moltke felt that the art of strategy was common sense.³⁰ Unfortunately, some senior officers graced with years of schooling and practical experience overlooked the fact that what they take as "common sense" or "instinct" resulted from years of professional education and mentoring. Certainly, von Moltke is considered one of the greats, but did he assume too much regarding the ability of the officer corps in the strategic arts thereby removing such instruction in formal officer education? The writer believes this was the case.

Perhaps his view on strategy originated with his vision of war. Germany was a small nation with limited resources. It could not afford an extended conflict. Wars had to be short, executed with quick and decisive operations at the operational and tactical level. Is there a need to educate officers on strategy for a short war that lasts only two or three weeks? Or is valuable education time better spent on the purely military skills needed to conduct quick decisive operations? This focus on the tactical/operational level education and lack of focus at the strategic level education in the officer schools played a critical role in later German officer education and in their conduct of the two major wars of the twentieth century.

THE CADET SCHOOLS

It is difficult to find evidence of instruction in political science or strategy at any level of German military education in the period following the establishment of the Second Reich. The officer education system started with the cadet schools. By the 1890s, cadets qualified for commissioning by one of two methods: A boy of 14 could enter the cadet corps and after graduation at the age of 18 he would need to complete the commission process. Another possible route for entry into the officer corps was by applying directly to individual regimental commanders after attendance at an accredited nine-year civilian school.³¹ The level of instruction in the two schools was similar. Education came to the forefront in the Wilhelmine period in Germany. By 1890 the cadet schools taught the basics and provided a good general education.

On February 13th 1890, William II wrote a memorandum to the Inspector General of Military Training and Education on the Subject of the curriculum at the cadet schools. It States: "The aim and object of all and particularly of military education, is the formation of the character by simultaneous physical, scientific and religious schooling and training. No Branch of education must be forced at the expense of another." ³²

The cadet schools were confined just to the basics: Religion, German, Latin Arithmetic, Mathematics, Physics, History, Geography, Freehand Drawing, and Map Drawing. There was no instruction on strategy, politics or foreign relations. (See Table 1,Curriculum of Cadet Schools 1899, Pgs 196 to 198 LaValle) The basic curriculum is displayed below.

SEXTA	T	QUINTA	T	QUARTA	1	UNTERERTIA	T
(Class ages 9-10)		(Class ages 10-12)		(Class ages 11-13)		(Class ages12-14)	
SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.
Religion	2	Religion	2	Religion	2	Religion	2
German	4	German	3	German	3	German	3
Latin	7	Latin	7	Latin	6	Latin	6
Arithmetic	4	Arithmetic	4	Mathematics	4	Mathematics	5
History	1	History	1	History	2	History	2
Geography	2	Geography	2	Geography	2	Geography	2
Natural-Science	2	Natural Science	2	Natural Science	2	Natural Science	2
Writing	2	Writing	2	Freehand Drawing	1	Freehand Drawing	2
		Freehand Drawing	1	French	6	French	6
OBERTERTIA		UNTERSEKUNDA		OBERSEKUNDA		UNTERPRIMA	
(Class ages 13-15)		(Class ages 14-16)		(Class ages 15-17)		(Class ages 16-18)	
SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.
Religion	2	Religion	2	Religion	1	Religion	2
German	3	German	3	German	3	German	3
Latin	·4	Latin	4	Latin	4	Latin	4
Mathematics	5	Mathematics	5	Mathematics	5	Mathematics	5
History	2	History	2	History	3	History/Geography	3
Geography	2	Geography	2	Geography	3	Physics	3(2)
Physics	2	Physics	3	Physics	3	Chemistry	2(3)
Freehand Drawing	elect,						
French	5	French	5	French	4	French	4
English	5	English	4	English	4	English	4
		Map Drawing	2	Map Drawing	2		
OBERPRIMA		SELECKTA					
(Class ages 16-18)							
SUBJECTS	Hrs.	SUBJECTS	Hrs.				
Religion	2	Note, This year					
German	3	followed the War					
Latin	4						
Mathematics ,	5	Academy					
History/Geography	3	curriculum.					
Physics	3(2)	ournoulding.		•			
Chemistry	2(3)						
Freehand Drawing	elect,						
French	5						
English	4						

TABLE 1 CADET SCHOOL CURRICULUM, 1899 (IN HOURS OF STUDY PER WEEK)
The cadet schools did not provide officers with knowledge of factors involved in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies or effective strategy.

CAPSTONE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: THE WAR ACADEMY

Officer professional military education did not end with the cadet schools and commissioning. Regimental commanders ensured that their officers received necessary military education through lectures and exercises. After a certain amount of service, officers were sent

to branch schools. Selection to these schools was based on good performance in their units. Doing well at the branch school enhanced chances of promotion. The pinnacle of the German officer education was selection for the General Staff training at the War Academy (Kriegsakademie).³³ A quick look at the curriculum of the German Kriegsakadamie (War College), by 1871, reveals an absence of instruction on strategy and politics.³⁴ The curriculum covered a variety of subjects including tactics, history, naval warfare, mathematics, chemistry, navigational astronomy, law of war, and foreign languages including French, English, Spanish Russian and Japanese. Instruction on politics and strategy is conspicuously absent. This is not to say that strategy was not discussed or highly debated outside of the curriculum. For example, a "federkreig" -- a running debate on strategy-- went on between the scholar Hans Debruck and the German General Staff.³⁵ Unfortunately, it seems that critical thinking and debate on high level policy and strategy was done mainly outside the classroom rather than a part of the educational process.

When Von Moltke the elder attended the General War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) from 1823-26, the curriculum was a more liberal one including such topics as General Literature and more importantly Effective Strategic Development. (See Table 2 which is a translated copy of the curriculum of 1823-26, from the Clemente study) The exact details of contents or the nature of the instruction on Effective Strategic Development are unknown and may be lost to history. Clemente described the narrowing curriculum:

While not as broad as during Schanhorst's tenure, the curriculum still evidenced an attempt to combine military and liberal studies into a course that would produce well rounded officers. However, by the 1860s the narrower opinion of the purpose of the "new" Academy had emerged. Peucker wanted a school that provided in the main a professional and technical education. ³⁶

Instruction on Effective Strategic Development was absent by 1871 (See Table 3 which includes a translated copy of the curriculum of 1871 and 1882 from the Clemente study). Clemente further notes in his study that general history instruction concentrated mainly on the importance of the military in German history rather than on issues relating to strategy. "The course did little to acquaint the officers with the numerous factors involved in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies...Having learned the art of war and little else, its members' contributions to national policy rested on the notion of the inevitability of armed conflict." Most importantly, he notes that "Surprisingly the serious study of strategy ceased." Research on this topic confirms the absence of the course on Effective Strategic Development or any comparable instruction. The U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) maintains original copies of the *Lehrordnung der Königlichen Kreigsakademie* (Curriculum of the Kings War Academy),

including the 1903 and 1910 editions. The curriculum topics at the turn of the century were most similar to those of in 1871 and 1882. Naval Warfare was added in 1907, and English and Japanese were added to the 1910 edition. (See Figures 1 & 2, Original German text) A review of the 1898 published book "*Die Aufnahme-Prüfung für die Kreigs-Akademie*" (A preparation book for the acceptance-exam for the War Academy) provided no preparation for officers about factors involved in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies or effective strategy development.³⁹

BAVARIAN CADET SCHOOLS AND WAR ACADEMY

Bavaria requires a separate look. From 1871-1918 the Bavarian Army remained independent in peacetime. Their officer training was not integrated into the Prussian system although their schools were subject to Prussian imperial standards and inspection. The schools were similar in that neither the Prussian nor the Bavarian schools provided cadets or War Academy officers with an education in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies or effective strategy. Yet, the Bavarian cadet schools were more progressive than those in Prussia, placing more emphasis on education than social standing in its officer corps. Bavaria changed the cadet school curriculum in 1868 to be more in accordance with the Realschule. Some twenty years later Prussia took the same steps. In 1868, Bavaria required that all active officers posses an Abitur. Although well educated, the Bavarian General Staff officer was no better trained in strategic thinking than his Prussian counterpart. John Howard LaValle claims the Bavarian Army had little need for strategic planning, and absolutely no need for it after the uniffication of the German Empire in 1871.

FIRST CLASS YEAR	SECOND CLASS YEAR	THIRD CLASS YEAR
Analysis of Finites Topography General History Statistics Artillery Tactics Terrain Surveying Conversational French Horsemanship	Spherical Progonometry Essentials of Mechanical Science Analysis of Infinites Science of Fortifications Natural Science/Physics Effective Strategic Development Terrain Surveying Conversational French German Literature	History of Selected Campaigns Fortress Warfare General Literature History of the General Staff Terrain Surveying

TABLE 2 - GENERAL WAR SCHOOL (ALLGEMEINE KRIEGSSCHULE) CURRICULUM FROM 1823-26.

(Note: The curriculum was a more liberal than those to follow, includes such topics as General Literature and more importantly Effective Strategic Development)

FIRST CLASS YEAR	1	1	SECOND CLASS YEAR	1	1	THIRD CLASS YEAR	1	1
	8	8		8	8		8	8
	7	8		7	8		7	8
	1	2		1	2		1	2
Formal Tactics	4	4	Applied Tactics	4	4	Military Justice	0	1
Military History	2	2	Military History to 1815	2	5	Military Hygiene	1	1
Arms and Ordnance	3	4	Permanent Fortifications	2	3	Military History to 1815	6	6
Field Fortifications	2	3	Military Surveying	1	2	Siege Warfare	2	3
Mathematics	9	7	Military Geography	4	4	General Staff Service	3	4
History	4	4	Military Administration	1	2	Mathematics	6	4
Geography	4	4	Mathematics	6	4	Goedesy (Only with math option)	3	3
Physical Geography	2	2	History	4	4	History of Literature	2	2
Conversational French	6	6	Intro to Hist. of Philosophy	2	2	History of Philosophy	1	0
Conversational Russian	2	6	Experimental Physics	4	4	General History until 1840	2	4
			Conversational French	6	6	Experimental Physics	4	3
		1	Conversational Russian	2	6	Conversational French	4	4
						Conversational Russian	2	6

TABLE 3 - WAR ACADEMY (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) 1871&1882, CURRICULUM IN HOURS PER WEEK.

Lehrstufe I. Stunden	Lehrftufe II.	Lehrstufe III.
1. Tattit 4	1. Tattit 4	1. Lattif 3
2. Kriegsgeschichte 3	2. Kriegsgeschichte 4	2. Kriegsgeschichte 4
3. Waffenlegre . 2	3. Befestigungslehre 2	3. Festungstrieg . 3
4. Befestigungslehre 2	4. Feldfunde, Auf-	4. Generalstabs
5. Militarrecht 1	nehmen 2	bienft 3
6. Geichichte 4	5. Planzeichnen . 2	5. Seetriegslehre . 1
7. Physis 2	(bis 31.3. j. 3s.)	6. Staatsvermal
7a. Phyfit für Ma:	6. Berfehrsmittel . 1	tung, Sinais- und
thematifer noch 2	7. Militäraefunds	Bollerrecht 2
8. Nathematit 4 ober	heitspflege 1	7. Mathematik 3) aber
9. Phys. Erdfunde 2)	8. Gejcichte 4	8. Bermeffungolehre 31
10. Allgem. 4 und	9 Mathematif 4)	O Grown Allie C
11. Französisch 6 ober		10. Ruffift 6 sbet
	II. Frangofijch 6 ober	
	12. Ruffijo 6 ober	
14. Japanifa*) . 10	13. Englifch 6 ober	.22
28 bam. 26 ober 25		
*) Für Japanisch treibenbe		
	*) Für Japanisch treibende	1
und allgem. Erdhinde.	fällt aus: Militärgefundheits.	
	pflege.	
)	

FIGURE 1. LEHRORDNUNG DER KÖNIGLICHEN KREIGSAKADEMIE, 1903 (CURRICULUM OF THE KINGS WAR ACADEMY)

IV. Übersicht über die Verteilung der Vortragsfächer auf die einzelnen Cehrstufen.

fächer au	if die einzelnen Cehi	ftufen.
	Wöchentlich:	
I. Lehrstufe.	II. Lehrstufe.	III. Lehrstufe.
Stunben	Stunden	Stunden
1. Lattit 4	1. Taktik 4	1. Tattif 3
2. Kriegsgeschichte 4	2. Kriegsgeschichte 4	2. Kriegsgeschichte 4
3. Baffenlehre 2	8. Befestigungslehre 1	3. Festungstrieg . 3
4. Befestigungslehre 2	4. Feldtunde, Auf-	4. Generalstabs.
5. Militärgejund=	nehmen 1	dienft 3
heitspflege 1	5. Planzeichnen 1	5. Geschichte 2
6. Militärrecht 1	6. Verkehrsmittel . 2	6. Astronom. Orts=
7. Geschichte 8	7. Seefriegslehre. 1	bestimmung 1
8. Mathematik 6) 7	8. Geschichte 3	Bermessungs= }4
Phys. Erdfunde 1 oder	9. Staatsverfassung	lehre 3)
9. Französisch 6 ober	und Berwaltung.	7. Französisch 4 ober
10. Englisch 6 ober	Bürgerl. Recht.	8. Englisch 4 ober
11. Ruffisch *) 6 ober		9. Russisch 6 ober
12. Japanijä*) 10	10. Mathematik 4)	10. Japanisch <u> 6</u>
24, 23, 21 ober 25	Astronom.Orts: \ 5	19 ober 21
	bestimmung . 1 Joder	
	11. Französisch 6 oder	
	12. Englisch 6 ober	
	13. Ruffich 6 oder	
	14. Japanish 6	
	23 oder 24	
	15. Außerdem Chemie 3	
		·

FIGURE 2. LEHRORDNUNG DER KÖNIGLICHEN KREIGSAKADEMIE, 1910 (CURRICULUM OF THE KINGS WAR ACADEMY)

So the Bavarian general staff never obtained the same level of prestige that its Prussian counterpart. "The main concern of the Bavarian general staff was to ensure that its contingent within the German Army had enough trained regimental staff officers in the case of war." Colonel Millotat confirms this assessment of the Bavarian War Academy:

A comparison of both academies curricula shows that Bavarian General Staff training was oriented more strongly on producing General Staff officers educated on a broad scientific basis. The speculation of high-level Bavarian officers and some Bavaria-loving historians after World War II supporting the claim that War Academy training in Munich had been generally superior to that of Prussia must be considered with caution. Munich did not deal with the tasks associated with the defense of the German Empire, and the Berlin War Academy graduate gained a faster insight into the general context of war planning than the Bavarian counterpart. ⁴³

Thus, Bavarian schools were no better than the Prussian schools in preparing their officers to handle the complex tasks of adapting military means to secure political ends. This educational failure plagued Germany through two World Wars. La Valle concludes his lengthy discussion with this observation:

No matter whether staff officers served in relative anonymity as specialists on regimental or divisional officer corps or rose to lead the general staff, they produced a failure in strategic leadership which the German Army's operational excellence could not overcome. Whatever other lessons the army tried to glean from its experience in the war, the problems represented by staff technocrats escaped it. The very men Seeckt and the high command sought to retain in the 100,000 were those who had served as staff officers during the war (W.W.I). The ultimate result of this tendency was that the Wehrmacht of the Second World War showed the same operational flexibility, and the same strategic ineptitude, as the Imperial Army had a generation earlier. 44

BETWEEN THE WARS

World War One ended at 1100hrs on 11 November 1918. Under terms of the treaty of Versailles Germany was reduced to a 100,000-man army with 4000 officers, ⁴⁵ Acceptance of the Versailles treaty required dissolution of the German General Staff as well as the closure of the War College. In the following years, under General Von Seeckt, the General Staff was ambiguously disguised as the Truppenamt (Troop Office). ⁴⁶ They analyzed the lessons of the First World War but at only the operational and tactical level. Time was also spent training future General Staff Officers, despite the fact that it was forbidden. The school was decentralized, conducting classes for a two year period in seven district headquarters, with a third year in Berlin. The focus of the school during the Reichwehr remained mostly unchanged. The legendary historian Sir, Liddell Hart aptly criticized their education:

The Seeckt-pattern professional became the modern Pontius Pilate, washing his hands of all responsibility for the orders he executed. Pure military theory deals in extremes that are hard to combine with wise policy. When soldiers concentrate on the absolute military air, and do not learn to think of grand strategy, they are more apt to accept political arguments that, while seeming right in pure strategy, commit policy beyond the point where it can halt. Extreme military ends are difficult to reconcile with moderation of policy. 47

A review of the General Staff candidate training from 1927 to 1930 does show some minor changes. (See table 4, Copied from pages176-179 Spires) The Germans' mobile doctrine was developing further, supported by instruction on *Motor Transport*, *Signals Service and Technical Instruction in Various Arms* during the first two years. Of note, the third year included training in *External and Internal Political Situation* and *Economic Situation*. (See table 4 below) However, these classes were conducted in lecture format so the material was presented in a very

unchallenging and non-controversial manner. The emphasis was on purely military issues at the tactical and operational levels. Training in Strategy and Grand Strategy was conspicuously absent.⁴⁸

FIRST CLASS YEAR	SECOND CLASS YEAR	THIRD CLASS YEAR
Oct 1927 to May 1928	Oct 1928 to May 1929	Oct 1929 to May 1930
Tactics (Reinforced Inf. Regt) Military History Supply/Quartering of Combat Troops Air Defense Technical Instruction for Various Arms Special Artillery Instruction Engineering Service Signal Service Sanitary Service and Care of Troops Veterinary Service Judge Advocate Department Foreign Language Physical Training Horsemanship	Tactics Military History Techniques of Command Army Organization Supply and Quartering of Combat Troops Army Transportation Service Air Defense Special Artillery Instruction (Chemical Warfare) Motor Transport Service Signals Service Army Administration Foreign Language Physical Training Horsemanship	Tactics (Reinforced Inf. Regt) Military History General Staff Service Army Organization Organization and Leadership in Foreign Armies Counterintelligence Supply and Quartering of Combat Troops Army Transportation Service Military Technology Naval War Leadership Air Defense External and Internal Political Situations Economic Situation Foreign Language Physical Training
		LI ' '

TABLE 4 - GENERAL STAFF TRAINING, CURRICULUM SUBJECTS, 1927 TO 1929.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM

On October 15 1935, Adolf Hitler was present at the re-opening and 125th anniversary of the Kriegsakademie. There is little evidence that Hitler had any deep concern or interest about the operation of the school or its curriculum. Less than a year later, in 1936, two American officers attended the course and provided detailed reports about the nature of the instruction and of evolution of the new German army. 49 Infantry Captain Harlan N. Hartness, U.S. Army. attended the Kriegsacademie from 1936 to 1938. He provided a detailed report on all aspects of the instruction and instructional methods. In it, there is little evidence in change from earlier curriculums. His report includes weekly schedules of the instruction for both the first and second year. The heavy focus remained on tactics, with additional instruction on aviation. Instruction covered Tactics, Supply, Transportation, Mechanization, Engineering, Signal Communications and Air Service. Instruction on Strategy and Politics are visibly absent. 50 He summarizes the aim of the school in his report: "The ultimate aim is the furthering of the combat effectiveness of the individual concerned and for future staff officers and higher commanders combat effectiveness means more than a mere mechanical functioning or detailed perfection. It means character and will, it means strength of purpose, but not a bull headed stuborness..." 51 CPT Hartness' report and the report by CPT A.C. Wedemeyer, who also attended the school from

1936 to 1938, confirms that the German Kriegsakademie was focused on developing tactical combat leaders and staff officers, but not on the development of strategic leaders.⁵²

STRATEGIC FAILURE IN BOTH WORLD WARS

Scholars generally concur that Germany lost both Wars due to a lack of effectively appraising the political and strategic environment. Volumes have been written on the particular strategic failures that led to its demise. In the First World War the German General Staff's limited ability to formulate a balanced strategic response, complicated by entangled political alliances resulted in the mobilization and execution of the only plan they had. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan has been war-gamed and analyzed a thousand times to determine whether changes to one wing or the other caused it to fail. However, it is evident that such a fixed plan cannot possibly keep current and anticipate all the complexities of a constantly changing political environment. The problem, however, was much more than a failed plan. As stated by one writer:

It was the lack of strategic and political judgment that led to the defeat of Germany, and this was mainly the responsibility of OHL and the general staff. Before 1914 the General Staff had adopted a strategic plan which fitted with concept of preventive war, but in practice was inflexible and unable to overcome the 'friction' of war. ⁵³

These same strategic failings and lack of consideration of the political context plagued Germany after the First World War. There is no evidence that the interwar studies or the military school system considered these factors. Instead, as seemed to be the German tradition, studies focused on the tactical and operational lessons. The next war, the Second World War, was marked by a number of exceptional early victories. The new mobile warfare, possible with some degree of mechanization and called "Blitzkrieg" in the West, was instrumental in these early victories. These victories, however, were tactical and operational victories. The overall Strategy for the war had not been developed by the German political leadership. True, Hitler was bold and imaginative, in contrast to his inflexible unimaginative General Staff. Hitler's directed changes to the invasion plan of France in 1940 demonstrate his abilities to use the nontraditional to achieve swift and decisive victories but he like his senior officers, had not developed higher level strategies.⁵⁴ He, like his senior officers, were more taken by brilliant tactical and operational victories than seriously developing logical national or military strategies. Thus, in both wars, the outcome was inevitable. The defeat for a very capable military force. At least a part of the reason for the defeats of 1914 and 1945 were Germany's strategic failures, a discipline in which its senior officers had little education. After

numerous interviews with key German Generals, Liddell Hart summed up the strange relationship between Hitler and his generals:

I remarked to Manteuffel that the more I heard about the German side of the War the more the impression had grown that, on the one hand, Hitler had a natural flair for strategy and tactics of an original kind, while the German General Staff, on the other hand, were very competent without much originality...An utter failure on the plane of war policy, or grand strategy, is seen to be accompanied by a remarkable, though uneven, run of performance in strategy and tactics.

CONCLUSION

Neither Hitler nor his well-trained generals seemed to understand the development process for logical military strategies. Had they such understandings, they would have likely waged war most differently. But neither their experience nor the education they were provided allowed them to function on the strategic level. Thus despite the operational and tactical talents of the lower level Commanders, Germany lost its wars.

In his book A Genius for War: the German General Staff, Dupuy writes:

To those who see little of value to learn from German military institutions, the principal failure of those institutions in World War II as World War I, was a failure in strategic conceptualization. And what good is mere technical competence if strategic planning is incompetent or inadequate...Another failure of the German General Staff was its inability to effect a satisfactory relationship with civilian authority. ⁵⁶

Yet Liddell Hart elaborates on Dupuy's observation: "The German generals of this war were the best-finished product of their profession-anywhere. They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers." ⁵⁷

The legendary historian may have missed a key point. German senior level officers needed a deeper understanding and wider outlook, not to become philosophers, but to be better military officers. What good are tactics if they do not support an effective strategy? The last measure of a military officer is his success or failure in effectively achieving his nations policy. History clearly reveals that after 1871 the senior German Commanders/Officers had a poor record of success in achieving national goals. These failures are commonly considered the result of ineffective strategy. Much historical evidence reveals that after the establishment of the German Empire in1871, the General Staff did not formally educate officers in the skills required for Effective Strategic Development. It cannot be proven that this lack of strategic education directly caused the loss of both world wars, but the linkage between this lack of strategic education and subsequent strategic failures seems strong. Fortunately for the free

world, the German officer of World War I and II was more a disciple of von Moltke than Clausewitz. Understanding strategy and politics is not "common sense", as suggested by famous General von Moltke.⁵⁸ Quite the contrary, the study of politics and strategic art are difficult topics for most soldiers. Since military strategy is only meaningful in the political context, the study of politics, strategy and areas outside of the military are essential to officer professional development. Only this type of education will arm him or her with the knowledge necessary to consider the political environment and translate national objectives and guidance into clear, concise, and achievable military objectives. Such strategic education is not intended to produce philosophers, but officers who can interact effectively with civilian counterparts and formulate the best military strategy to achieve the goals of the nation.

WORD COUNT = 6,492

ENDNOTES

- ¹ U.S Army War College, <u>Core Curriculum Course 2. AY02</u>, "War, National Security Policy & Strategy", (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001),33.
- ² Carl Von Clausewitz, <u>On War</u>, Ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, 1976),87
- ³ U.S Army War College, <u>Core Curriculum Course 2. AY02</u>, "War, National Security Policy & Strategy", (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001), See Lesson 2-5 pg 33
- ⁴ Roderick Magee. Strategic Leadership Primer, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 3, Note: A common understanding or guiding definition of military strategy is essential to any discussion of the application of strategic art. The U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military and associated Terms offers a basic definition: "Strategy is the art and science of developing and using political, economical, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and lessen the chances of defeat." Application of the above process comprises strategic art. As defined by the U.S. Army War College: "Strategic art is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends ways and means to promote and defend our nation's interests. These definitions provide a concise understanding of a complex concept. The work by the Author F. Lykke Jr. clarifies the political/military linkage is key to any successful strategy. Military force is a policy tool used to accomplish national objectives or ends. Military force is not an end in of itself. Military resources are the means used to accomplish these national objectives. The concept of how, when and where we apply resources equates to our strategic concept or ways. This combination of ends/objectives. ways/concepts and means/resources add up to a national strategy. German strategic failures in the two World Wars can be analyzed in light of the strategic paradigm.
- ⁵ Cerami and Holcomb, <u>The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy</u> (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 225, note: The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy expresses the concept as an equation, Strategy=Ends + Ways +Means. This concept applies to the formulation of all types of strategy to include Political, Military, and Economic. Ends are defined as the objectives, ways are the course of action and means are the instruments used. In the case of Military Strategy, Ends represent National Objectives, Ways are the National Strategic Concepts and Means are the National Resources used to gain the objective. Military Strategy is only meaningful in the political context. Military Strategy is thus defined as "The art and science of employing the armed forces to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force". Military Strategy= Objectives +Strategic Concepts + Resources. "The crucial step in strategic thinking is to translate national objectives and guidance into clear, concise, and achievable military objectives by competent trained officers who understand the linkage.
- ⁶ Steven E. Clemente, <u>For King and Kaiser, The Making of the Prussian Army Officer</u> (Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1992), 176, Note prior to 1860 The General War School (Allgemeine Kriegsschule) from 1823-26 the curriculum was a more liberal one including such topics as General Literature and more importantly Effective Strategic Development. (See table two of this SRP which includes a translated copy of the curriculum of 1823-26, The exact

details of contents or the nature of the instruction on Effective Strategic Development are unknown and may be lost to history.

⁷ Peter Paret, <u>Makers of Modern Strategy</u>, (Princeton University, 1986), 324.

⁸ Keith Simpson, <u>History of the German Army</u> (The Military Press, Crown Publishers, 1985), 10, Note any study of German Strategy or the German Officer requires an understanding of the social political development of Germany. This work by Keith Simpson provides an excellent overview. Most Americans do not realize that until 1871, "Germany" was for the most part more of a geographical expression of a number of principalities, cities and independent states than a unified people. Prior to 1871, if a German was asked what nationality he or she claimed. they would likely reply with a number expressions. It is not likely that they would refer to themselves as Deutsch (German). Even today, a fair number of people feel a strong kinship with their region. The "states" within Germany represent very different peoples, cultures and dialects. Thus military customs and traditions in Bavaria prior to the First World War were very different than those in Prussia. Understanding early German history makes the national cohesion seen in the Second World War even more amazing. Germany as a nation was built around the military victories of the small state of Prussia. In 1870 Prussia (Bismarck) was able to provoke France into a war over a question of Spanish Throne succession. Prussia quickly overwhelmed and defeated France taking Paris. In 1871 Prussia signed a peace settlement with France that ceded Alsace -Lorraine to Prussia and concluded the Franco-Prussian War. On 18 Jan 1871, in the Palace of Versailles King William the First of Prussia was Proclaimed Emperor of the second German Reich (which was to last until the German defeat in 1918).

⁹ Simpson, 21

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Note, Frederick the Great who ruled from 1740 until 1786 was one of three key figures to mold the German military development. Generals, Scharnhost, von Moltke will be covered later in the text. Interesting, Is the degree that the influences of General Carl von Clausewitz impacted American military thinking as compared to Prussian/German thinking.

¹² Paret, 281

¹³ COL T.N. Dupuy, <u>A Genius for War</u> (Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice-Hall,1977), 22, Dupuy names Scharnhorst, Gneissenau, Grolman, Boyen and Clausewitz as the five r"Reformers"

¹⁴ Paret, 281

¹⁵ Oberst i.G. Christian O.E.Millotat, <u>Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System</u>(Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, SSI, 1992) ,27-28

¹⁶ COL. T.N. Dupuy, 25

¹⁷ Millotat, 29

¹⁸ Ibid, 33

¹⁹ Dupuy, 45

²⁰ Ibid, 61

²¹ Walter Goerlitz (Görlitz), <u>History of the German General Staff</u>, Translated by B. Battershaw (New York, Praeger, 1953), 83

²² Clemente, xiii

²³ Ibid, Note: Clemente makes a number of good points in the above quote. However, I must take some issue with his stereotypical characterization of the German Officer as of 1914 as being overly obedient, lacking imagination and initiative. A number of works have been written showing that with "Auftragstatik" the German Army was ahead of any other nation of the time in encouraging initiative and imagination on the part of battlefield officers. The puzzling question is how could the German officer education system produce officers so expert at the operational and tactical level, yet completely omit education on the strategic level?

²⁴ Parret, Pg 528

²⁵ Note, The term "the elder" is used to prevent confusion with the younger General Von Moltke of World War One fame.

²⁶ Dupuy,62

²⁷ Goerlitz (Görlitz), 1

²⁸ Dupuy, 304

²⁹ Clemente, 176

³⁰ Clemente, 181 " Surprisingly the serious study of strategy had ceased. Although offered as a separate subject during his tenure, Moltke believed that a long range strategy could be developed with common sense and knowledge of military history. As a result the latter received inordinate attention while lectures on the economic and domestic problems and the relationship to strategy remained absent"

³¹ John Howard LaValle, <u>Military Professionalism and the Realities of War, German Officer</u> Training in the Great War (Ann Arbor MI, A Bell and Howard Information Co. 1997), 13

³² Clemente, 242-43

³³ LaValle, 38

³⁴ Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, <u>Lehrordnung der Königlichen Kreigsakademie</u> (Berlin, Königliche Hofbuchhandlung, 1903) Maintained in the U.S, Army Military History Institute, German text, See page 4 in the 1903 edition, page 23 in the 1910 edition. Also, see also, Clemente, 176-177

³⁵ See Paret starting page 326, Chapter 12 by Gordon A. Craig gives a good insight as to the views of Hans DelBrück and his debates with the General Staff on strategy. This was done though the means of the monthly periodical (*Preussiche Jahrbücher*). These running debates are sometimes referred to as the 'FederKreig' (Pen War). Craig describes that Delbrück thought: "Clausewitz's dictum was too often forgotten by men who misinterpreted Clausewitz as having argued for freedom of military leadership from political restrictions. Delbrück returned to Clausewitz doctrine and argued that the conduct of war and the planning of strategy must be conditioned by the aims of state policy and that once strategical thinking becomes inflexible and self-sufficient even the most brilliant tactical success can lead to political disaster."

³⁹ A. Kuhn Major a.D. <u>Die Aufnahme-Prüfung für die Kreigs-Akademie</u>" Berlin, Liebelichen Buchhandlung, 1898) A preparation book for the acceptance-exam for the War Academy, maintained in the U.S, Army Military History Institute See page 4 in the 1903 edition, German text, See pages 24 to 29 that talk about preparation and topics for the 1899 entrance exam.)

³⁶ Clemente, 176

³⁷ Clemente, 181

³⁸ Ibid

⁴⁰ LaVale, 33

⁴¹ Ibid,

⁴² LaVale, 43

⁴³ Millotat, 39

⁴⁴ Lavalle, 193,194

⁴⁵ Spire, viii2

⁴⁶ Dupuy, 216.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 128 Liddell Hart quote taken from page 128, Dupuy)

⁴⁸ David N. Spires, <u>Image and Reality, The Making of the German Officer</u> (Westport CT, Greenwood Press,1984) Pg47 (this reference footnotes an Interview with Model, Deutsche General Stabbsoffizer, pg 51-53: NA78, 375, pp.6339194-6339203).

⁴⁹ Wedermeyer, Albert C, G-<u>2 Report on the German General Staff School</u>, (U.S. War Dept, General Staff, Military intel file, 1938) G-2, maintained in the U.S, Army Military History Institute (MHI)

⁵⁰ G-2, U.S. War Dept, General Staff, G-2 <u>Information Digest Military Attache Reports 1933-1940</u> See Hartness Report on the German War College, maintained in the U.S, Army Military History Institute (MHI)

⁵¹ Ibid, see pg23 Hartness Report

⁵² See Hartnees and Wedermeyer reports.

⁵³ Simpson, 107

⁵⁴ Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, <u>Lost Victories</u>., Edited and Translated by Martin Blumenson(Chicago, H Regency Co. Praeger, 1958), 94-109 Note, Changes to the original plans which resulted in the highly successful invasion of France of 1940 are often accredited to Hitler. Field Marshal von Manstein was a key architect of the plan. Although he concedes that the concept for a swift armor force through the Ardennes may have been a decision that Hitler reached on his own. He also notes that is possible that Hitler conceived the idea from General Busch who was acquainted with Mansteins views

⁽Note: As if to drive the point home that senior German officers did not understand the roots of strategy or the importance of the political context, Field Marshall von Mannstein uses this same quote in his book. See Author's Preface of Field Marshall Erich von Manstein book Lost Victories. He writes: "This book is the personal narrative of a *soldier*, in which I have deliberately refrained from discussing political problems or matters with no direct bearing on events in the military field. In the same connexion it is perhaps worth recalling a statement of Captain B.H. Liddel Hart's: "The German generals of this war were the best-finished product of their profession-anywhere. They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers.")

⁵⁶ Dupuy, 291

⁵⁷ Liddel Hart. 300

⁵⁸ Clemente, 181

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